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CORCORAN v. ARDRA:* THE IMPACT OF
INSOLVENCY ON INTERNATIONAL
REINSURANCE ARBITRATION
JOHN S. DIAcoNis**
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards' (the "Convention") facilitates the enforcement and recognition of international arbitration
agreements and awards. 2 Congress has implemented the Convention in the United States through legislation 3 which requires parties
to abide by their agreements to arbitrate. Recognizing the importance of utilizing arbitral agreements in the international context,
4
the courts have enforced the legislation.
The business of insurance5 and reinsurance 6 is international.
* Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2260 (1991).
** Member, N.Y. Bar. Mr. Diaconis is a partner in the New York law firm
of Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker. He was counsel for the majority of the reinsurers in Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d
630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The views expressed in this article represent those of
the author and should not be attributed to his firm or any of its clients.
1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 3) (1958) (effective December 29, 1970).
2. Generally speaking, there are three bodies of statutory law applicable to
arbitration in the United States. In addition to the Convention, the United
States Arbitration Act ("USAA") and the various state laws are applicable to an
arbitration. Chapter 2 of the USAA, which contains the enabling legislation in
the United States for implementation of the Convention, governs international
arbitration. Chapter 1 of the USAA would also apply to an international arbitration to the extent that it does not conflict with the Convention as implemented by Chapter 2. State arbitration laws also apply to international
arbitration to the extent that they do not conflict with Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. See John S. Diaconis, InternationalArbitration: Subpoena Powers of
Arbitratorsin New York, 200 N.Y.L.J. No. 68, Oct. 6, 1988, at 5.
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
4. Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974); Cooper v. Ateliers De La Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. 1982).
5. Insurance is defined as a contract where one party undertakes for consideration to compensate another for a loss to a specific matter caused by specific perils. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 721 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Reinsurance is a transaction whereby a reinsurer, for consideration,
agrees to indemnify a reinsured for all or part of a loss which the reinsured may
sustain under a policy or policies of insurance which have been issued by the
reinsured to an original insured. R.L. CARTER, REINSURANCE 7 (1979); see also,
People ex.rel. Continental Ins. Co. v. Miller, 70 N.E. 10, 12 (N.Y. 1904) (reinsurance is a "contract by which one insurer insures the risks of another"); KLAUS
GERATHEWOHL, REINSURANCE-PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, Ch. 24 (1980); HENRY
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The activities of insurance and reinsurance corporations often take
place in different countries. 7 American insurance companies often
insure risks abroad,s and foreign insurance and reinsurance companies cover risks located in the United States.9
The preferred method of dispute resolution in the international
reinsuranca community is arbitration; it is considered quicker, less
costly, and more flexible than litigation. 10 The insurer or reinsurer
doing business on an international basis, like other international
merchants, prefers arbitration to litigation in local state courts
T. KRAMER, THE NATURE OF REINSURANCE IN REINSURANCE 4 (Robert W.
Strain ed., 1980) (hereinafter KRAMER) (reinsurance is "an insurance contract"); N. David Thompson, CriticalIssues of the Eighties: How Trends In Reinsurance Will Affect Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory Actions, 16 FORUM
1038, 1039 (1981); KRAMER, SUGGESTED REINSURANCE GLOSSARY 661-62 (1987).
There are two kinds of reinsurance. One is facultative, and the other is a treaty.
Facultative reinsurance involves the reinsurance of all or part of a policy of
insurance written by the reinsured. Treaty reinsurance involves the reinsurance of a particular class or classes of business written by the reinsured. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Uniguard Mut. Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 623,626 n.5 (Neb. 1980).
The basic purpose of reinsurance is to spread risk of loss and increase the capacity of insurance companies to underwrite or accept new risks. Retrocessional
coverage denominates the coverage provided to a reinsurer by another reinsurance company thereby further spreading risk of loss.
7. The United States insurance and reinsurance industries rely heavily on
foreign reinsurance to spread risk of loss. The reinsurance industry in the
United States is dependant on foreign reinsurance in general, and the London
market in particular, for volume and the underwriting of difficult classes of
business. In fact, foreign reinsurers underwrite between 25% to 30% of reinsurance in the United States. Carolyn Aldred, U.S. Leans on Europe, Reinsurer
Says, Bus. REINS., May 8, 1988, at 14; Marian Freedman, Reinsurers and Insurers are Two PeasFrom DifferentPods, BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP.: PROP./CAS. INS.
ED., Apr. 1188, at 116.
8. See Belco Petroleum Corp. v. AIG Oil Rig., Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d 776, 781
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (involving insurance of oil and gas operations in Peru).
9. See American Marine Ins. Group v. Price Forbes Ltd., 560 N.Y.S.2d 638,
639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (reinsurance of New York based insurer by Bermuda
based company and retrocessional coverage afforded by Lloyd's and British
companies).
10. One commentator has said that "reinsurance participants 'abhor' litigation of their disputes and prefer arbitration not only for traditional reasons
(cost, expediency, confidentiality, etc.), but also because of their fear of 'bad
law."' John M. Sheffey, ReinsuranceIntermediaries:TheirRelationship to Reinsured and Reinsurer,16 FORUM 922 (1981). Significantly, a number of recent
conflicting decisions have caused additional concern in the industry due to a
perceived uncertainty involved in litigation. CompareTravelers Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Reins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 492,498 (S.D.N.Y.) (reinsurer need not show prejudice to prevail on late note defense), vacated in part,739 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (question of late notice depends on industry custom and practice) with
Uniguard v. North River Ins. Co., 766 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (question of
late notice depends on industry custom and practice), (reinsurer must show
prejudice to prevail on late notice defense) question certified, 949 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1991) and Christiana Gen. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F.
Supp. 150, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-7912 (2d Cir. Sept. 23,
1991).
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which are perceived to be less hospitable to foreign entities."
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of reinsurance
disputes, and consequently, there has been a significant increase in
international reinsurance arbitrations.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' 2 gives the states broad power to
regulate the business of insurance.' 3 In discharging these powers,
the states have promulgated extensive legislation to deal with the
11. See Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of InternationalDisputes, 23 INT'L LAw. 187 (1989). However, it should be noted that the insurance
industry has also recently expressed frustration that arbitration has become expensive and complex with the result of becoming increasingly similar to litigation. Roger Scotton, Hostility is Increasingin ReinsuranceDisputes,Bus. INS.,
(Nov. 20, 1989) at 85-86. In fact, a federal jurist in New York expressed displeasure at arbitration in 1983:
Once hailed as boon to the commercial world, the experience of this Court
in recent years raised serious questions whether the high hopes of prompt
disposition by the arbitral process have been realized. Arbitration is not a
one-way street. It has its drawbacks as well as advantages. In calendar
calls in recent years, attorneys seek extensive adjournments of pending
cases solely based upon unexplained delays before arbitrators or failure to
appoint arbitrators.
Bell Canada v. ITT Telecomm. Corp., 563 F. Supp. 636, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988). The McCarran-Ferguson Act embodies a
clear congressional mandate "that regulation of the insurance industry be left
to the several states." Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1980). The Act
provides that the states shall regulate and tax the business of insurance. 15
U.S.C. § 1011 (1988). Under the Act, no Act of Congress shall be construed to
interfere with state regulation unless the intent to preempt is express. Id. The
McCarran Act was enacted nine months after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. South-E. Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In that case,
the Court reversed the prior rule enunciated in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), that the business of insurance was not interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Court
held that the business of insurance constituted interstate commerce, thereby
reversing the lower court's dismissal of an indictment for rate fixing under the
Sherman Act on the ground that the business of insurance was not interstate
commerce and thus not within Congress' power to regulate. Id.
In response to concerns raised by insurers, legislatures and commissioners,
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1915. The House Report
states that it was "not the intention of Congress ... to clothe the states with any
power to regulate or tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had
been held to possess prior to ... South-E. Underwriters...." H.R. REP. No. 193,
64th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1945 U.S.C.C.A.N. 670, 671. Congress intended to regulate "insurance by the States, subject always to the limitation Act
laid out in controlling decisions of the Supreme Court." Id.
13. Specifically, the McCarran Act as codified provides: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by
any State for the purposes of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
The first part of § 1012(b) provides that federal legislation does not preempt state insurance law unless the intention to do so is indicated by specific
inference. Id. The second part of the statute provides that federal anti-trust legislation is applicable to insurance to the extent that state law does not regulate
the business. Id. This provision limits the powers given to the state under the
first part of the statute. Section 1012(b) of the Act provides a hiatus until June
30, 1948 so as to allow states the opportunity to enact legislation as permitted by
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business of insurance in general and the insolvency of insurance
and reinsurance corporations in particular. 14 The insolvency legislation promulgated by the states furnishes a comprehensive method
for winding up an insolvent company's affairs.15 It often vests ex16
clusive jurisdiction over liquidations in a state court proceeding.
In these proceedings state insurance commissioners, often referred
to as "liquidators," proceed on behalf of the insolvent insurance or
reinsurance corporation to marshall assets and settle claims against
the estate for the benefit of policyholders, stockholders and
creditors. 17
the laws exemption. Id, State laws were thus promulgated to regulate various
aspects of the business.
Section 1013(a) of the Act provides a hiatus until June 30, 1948 before the
Sherman, Clayton, Federal Trade Commission or Robinson-Patman Act will
apply to the business of insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1988).
Section 1013(a) provides that the McCarran Act shall not be deemed to
render the Sherman Act inapplicable to an "agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id. In Barry v. Saint
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 438 U.S. 531 (1978), the Supreme Court broadened
the scope of the term boycott.
Section 1014 provides that the National Labor Relations Fair Labor Standards Act and the Merchant Marine Act are applicable to the insurance business. 15 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988). Section 1014 provides that Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, Guam and the District of Columbia are in the definition of "state." 15
U.S.C. § 1015 (1988).
14. See generally 19 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1062110720 (1982); David J. Howard, Uncle Sam Versus The Insurance Commissioners: A Multi Level Approach To Defining The "Business of Insurance" Under
The McCarran-FergusonAct, 25 WILL
L. REV. 1 (1989); Regulation of
Reinsurance, Past, Present and Future - The Politics of Insolvency, 11 INS. LITIG. RPT. 222 (1989). T. Darrington Semple Jr. & Robert M. Hall, The Reinsurer's Liability In the Event Of The Insolvency Of A Ceding Property And
Casualty Insurer,21 ToRT & INS. L. J. 407 (1986).
15. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.33-440.45 (Baldwin 1978); N.Y. INS.
LAW §§ 7401-7409 (McKinney 1992).
16. HowARD, supra note 14, at 13. For example Article 74 of the New York
Insurance Law empowers the liquidator "subject to the direction of the [New
York Supreme Court] to undertake to liquidate the insolvent company." N.Y.
INS. LAW. § 7409(c) (McKinney 1992). The provisions of Article 74 are considered to be "exclusive in their operation and furnish a complete procedure for
the protection of the rights of all parties interested." Knickerbocker Agency,
Inc. v. Holz, 149 N.E.2d 885, 889 (N.Y. 1958).
17. In the landmark reinsurance case of Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v.
Pink, 302 U.S. 224 (1937), the Supreme Court held that a reinsurer could avoid
liability to the liquidator of an insolvent reinsured for reimbursement of a claim
on the ground that the liquidator had made no actual payment of the loss to the
original insured and thus no loss had occurred under the reinsurance agreement. Typically, in the liquidation situation, losses are rarely, if ever, paid in
full while the liquidator nevertheless endeavors to collect funds from all available debtors of the estate.
Thus, in response to Pink, state legislatures enacted laws which prevented
insurance companies from obtaining a credit on their financial statements for
reinsurance unless such reinsurance was payable to the liquidator notwithstanding an insolvency. N.Y. INs. LAw § 1308 (McKinney 1992). These statutes
required, in essence, the inclusion of the so-called standard "insolvency clause"
in reinsurance contracts. The insolvency clause provides that the reinsured
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Insurance and reinsurance corporation insolvencies have increased in the past ten years.' s In 1980, there were only four property and casualty insurer insolvencies, and five life and health
insolvencies. 19 In 1989, there were 23 property and casualty insurer insolvencies, and 43 life and health insurer insolvencies. 20
The increase in arbitration, coupled with the recent increase in
the number of insolvencies, has resulted in a conflict between the
reinsurers' right or desire to arbitrate and a state liquidator's right
to resolve an insurance company's insolvency in state court. More
specifically, if a reinsurer has a dispute with an insolvent insurance
or reinsurance company,21 it may be precluded from arbitration by
virtue of state liquidation laws.
This dilution of the right to arbitrate is a matter of some importance to the industry, in view of the historical desire to avoid formal, judicial dispute resolution. It also presents an interesting
question as to application of the Convention to an insurance insolvency situation. In Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co.,22 the New York

Court of Appeals held that a dispute between a liquidator and a
foreign reinsurance corporation was within an exception to the
Convention because the arbitration clause was incapable of being
performed due to the insolvency and, thus, the dispute was not capable of settlement by arbitration.2 While the court in Ardra reccannot avoid a contractual obligation to reimburse simply due to the insolvency
of the reinsured. Based on the insolvency clause, the liquidators routinely pursue the estate's creditors in state court. For a discussion of the origin of the
statutory insolvency clause, see Skandia Am. Reins. Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F.
Supp. 715, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
18. In a recent Congressional Report, it was noted that "[t]he parallels between the present situation in the insurance industry and the early stages of the
savings and loan debacle are both obvious and deeply disturbing." Letter from
John D. Dingell, chairman, Committee On Energy and Commerce (Feb. 7,1990)
(letter to Committee citing Failed Promises, Insurance Company Insolvencies,
A Report By the Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations Of The Committee On Energy And Commerce).
These failures have also given rise to a debate as to whether federal regula-

tion of the industry is necessary. Cf. Michael Bradford, Iowa's HagerBlasts Federal Regulation, Bus. INS., Oct. 3, 1988, at 43.
19. Leonard Sloane, Questions Are Intensifying About Insurance Safety
Net, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,1990, at 50; see also Eric N. Berg, Insurers Tangled In
Bitter Debates Over Regulation, N.Y. Tnss, Nov. 1, 1990, at 1; Stacy Adler, Insolvency Toll Likely To Grow: Regulator, Bus. INS., Nov. 20, 1989, at 97; Adrienne Locke, Business Insurance Report Assesses Cause of Insolvencies, Bus.
INS., Aug. 28, 1989, at 61.
20. Id.
21. As noted in the discussion at supra note 18, the reinsurer's liability
under a reinsurance contract is not affected by the reinsured's insolvency.
Globe Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. American Bonding & Cas. Co., 217 N.W. 268, 278
(Iowa 1928).
22. 567 N.E.2d 969, aff'd, 565 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S.Ct.
2260 (1991).
23. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 25:527

ognized the strong policy concerns of international comity, which
clearly militate in favor of arbitration, it nevertheless deferred to
the state interest in maintaining control over liquidation
proceedings.
This article will discuss the decision in Ardra. Part I will discuss early arbitration law and Chapter 1 of the United States Arbitration Act (the "USAA"). Part II will discuss implementation and
application of the Convention in the United States in accordance
with Chapter 2 of the USAA, plus certain exceptions to arbitrability thereunder. Part III will discuss case law prior to Ardra
which dealt with arbitration in a liquidation situation. Part IV will
discuss and analyze the decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in Ardra. Finally, the Conclusion will discuss the author's views
about the effect of Ardra on international reinsurance arbitration.
I.

EARLY ARBITRATION LAW AND THE UNITED STATES
ARBITRATION ACT

A.

Early Arbitration Law

The enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards was not
traditionally favored by the British common law. 24 This view,
which was firmly imbedded in British precedent, was based on the
theory that arbitration agreements improperly ousted courts of
jurisdiction.
The British theory of arbitration was adopted by American
courts. Thus, the early history of American arbitration law is
marked by judicial suspicion of both the need for arbitration as well
as the competence of arbitrators. 25 The courts were of the view
that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were revocable and
24. For a discussion of the historical development of early arbitration law,
see, e.g., William Catron Jones, History of CommercialArbitrationIn England
and The United States: A Summary View, reprinted in, THOMAS M. DOMIE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 127 (1958); FRANCEs A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, ITs HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); Paul L.
Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitrationLaw, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
25. See The Atlanten, 252 U.S. 313, 315 (1920). In The Atlanten, Justice
Holmes affirmed the lower court's decision written by Judge Learned Hand in
the district court and in the Court of Appeals by Judge Hough that a dispute
between a steamship owner anai charterers for the former's refusal to proceed
with a voyage from Pensacola, Florida to Scandinavia was not arbitrable. Id. at
316.
The arbitration clause broadly provided that if any dispute arises it should
be settled by arbitration. Id. at 315. The steamship owner refused to proceed
with the voyage at the agreed freight due to "increased war risk and other difficulties." Id. at 314. The charterer brought suit, and the owner sought to arbitrate. Id. The lower courts held that the own6r repudiated the contract and,
therefore, the arbitration clause did not apply. Id. at 315. Justice Holmes wrote
that the owner had not repudiated the contract in toto as he assumed the con-
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unenforceable.2
B. United States ArbitrationAct
In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act 27
which legislatively overturned judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. 28 The USAA established that agreements to
arbitrate were on the same footing as other contracts. 29 Under the
USAA, arbitration agreements were no longer construed to be "invalid, revocable or unenforceable. ''30 Thus, the USAA set forth a
new policy which favored the enforcement of arbitration agreements, thereby greatly expanding their utility in the commercial
31
context.
The USAA was applicable to arbitral agreements involving interstate commerce, foreign commerce and maritime contracts. The
legislation implemented by Congress under the USAA provided for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, 32 a stay of litigation
tract was binding and set a limit of liability, but that the owner simply refused
to proceed with the voyage. Id.
According to Justice Holmes, this was not a "dispute" within the ambit of
the arbitration clause. Id. The court was of the view that the arbitration clause
referred to disputes where the parties were performing the contract, but not to
a dispute where the substance of the contract was repudiated, citing to Lord
Haldane's opinion in Jureidini v. National British & Irish Millers Ins. Co., App.
Cas. 499, 505 (1915). While the court in The Atlanten did not consider the general question of the weight to be afforded to an arbitration clause, it nevertheless appears to have taken pains to narrowly construe the scope of the clause.
Today, the repudiation of a contract in a manner similar to the steamship
owner's repudiation would clearly not render an arbitration clause void under
the doctrine of separability, unless, of course, the arbitration clause itself was
procured through fraud. Prima Paint Corp. v. Floor & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395,402-04 (1967). Additionally, given the current rule that doubts must be
resolved in favor of arbitrability, it is apparent that, today, the broad clause in
The Atlanten would be construed so as to encompass the dispute in that case.
26. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F.
Supp. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); see Sayre, supranote 24, at 1 for a discussion of
United States Asphalt and activities following that decision by the New York
Chamber of Commerce and other organizations to further the possibilities for
use of arbitration.
27. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988) (ch. 1 of the USAA).
28. Congress was apparently of the view that legislation was necessary to
overturn the existent precedent, even though there had been some judicial relaxation of arbitral suspicion. H.R. REP.No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
29. In addition to the desire to enforce contractual undertakings, Congress
took into account the expense and delay inherent in the litigation process. Id. at
2.
30. Robert Lawrence & Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,407 (2d
Cir, 1959).
31. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Dean Wit ter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
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pending the conclusion of an arbitration proceeding, 33 and enforcement of the resultant arbitral award by a court of law.34
While the USAA was a watershed for proponents of arbitration, it nevertheless applied only to a limited number of arbitration
situations.3 5 Specifically, the USAA did not serve as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. Thus, to seek judicial enforcement in federal court, a plaintiff had to show either: diversity
of citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy; or, a federal
question which consequently limited use of the statute to those
cases within federal subject matter jurisdiction.36 The USAA also
could not compel arbitration abroad, which also limited its usefulness in the international context.3 7
Thus, while the USAA had, and continues to have,38 a positive
impact on arbitration, efforts continued to broaden the ability of
commercial entities to arbitrate. During the 1940's and 1950's, there
were attempts to enforce arbitration clauses in international trade
and commerce through bilateral treaties.3 9 The bilateral approach
proved to be slow; there was delay inherent in negotiations and subsequent ratification of the individual treaties. The bilateral approach also did not result in uniform treaties, but in variant terms
dependent upon the subject negotiations between particular contracting parties.40 This uncertainty could not have been comforting
to the business community at large; however, it was not long before
efforts to provide for greater uniformity proved to be fruitful.

II. THE CONVENTION
A.

Implementation

The Convention was negotiated in 1958 when forty-five nations
met in New York under the auspices of the United Nations to resolve uncertainties in the laws applicable to international arbitra33. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).

34. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Act, as noted, applied to arbitral agreements
involving maritime contracts and contracts involving commerce, except for
grounds which exist at law or equity for revocation of the agreement. Id.
36. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Son, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d
Cir. 1933).
37. Midlands Tar Distillers, Inc. v. M. T. Lotos, 362 F. Supp. 1311, 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
38. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974) (claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arising out of purported breach of contract held arbitrable).
39. For a discussion of arbitration before implementation of the Convention, see e.g., Leonard v. Quigley, Accession By The UnitedStates To The United
Nations Convention On The Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral

Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
40. Id. at 1054.
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tion.4 1 The signatories to the Convention agreed to enforce arbitral
agreements and awards with respect to international commercial
matters. The United States attended the Convention, but did not
sign the Treaty until twelve years later.
On October 4, 1968, the United States Senate consented to ratification of the Convention. Subsequently, on July 31, 1970, the Convention was implemented by Congress. The United States acceded
to the Convention on September 30, 1970, and on December 29,
1970, the Convention became the law of the land after the instrument of accession was filed. The goal of Congress in implementing
the Convention was to encourage the recognition of international
arbitral agreements and to unify the standards under which such
agreements and awards were enforced. 42 Eighty-one countries have
43
become parties to the Convention.
The Convention is enforced in the United States in accordance
with Chapter 2 of the USAA. 44 The enactment of Chapter 2 demonstrates a very firm commitment by Congress to eliminate prior
judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, particularly
45
in the context of international commercial transactions.
Section 20146 provides that the Convention shall be enforced in
accordance with Chapter 2 of the USAA. Section 20247 provides
that the terms of the Convention shall apply to an arbitration
agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial. To fall within Section 202, the relationship must involve property located abroad,
envisage performance or enforcement abroad, or have some other
reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states.
Section 20348 provides that an action under the terms of the
Convention is deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the
United States. Under that section, the district courts of the United
States shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the amount
in controversy.
41. John P. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention
On Foreign Arbitral Awards In The United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COm. 735
(1971).
42. See H.R. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1978).
43. Jack Garvey & Totton Heffelfinger, Towards FederalizingU.S. International Commercial Arbitration,25 INT'L LAW. 209, 214 n.27 (1991).
44. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (1988). Thus, Congress implemented the convention
by amending or adding to the Federal Arbitration Act or, as we have referred to
it, the USAA.
45. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir.
1974).
46. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
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Section 20449 provides that, for purposes of venue, an action
under the Convention may be brought in any district court in
which, save for the arbitration agreement, an action between the
parties could be brought. Additionally, under Section 204, venue is
proper in a district court which embraces the place designated in
the agreement as the place of arbitration when that place is in the
United States.
Section 20550 provides that, when the subject matter of an action in a state court pertains to an arbitration agreement or award
within the Convention, the defendant may, at any time before trial,
remove such action to a district court embracing the place where
the action is pending.
Section 20651 provides that a court with jurisdiction under
Chapter 2 may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with
the agreement at any place therein provided whether within or
outside of the United States.52 The court may also appoint arbitra53
tors in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
Section 20754 provides that, within three years after rendition
of an arbitral award falling within the Convention, a party may apply to the appropriate court for an order confirming the award. The
award must be confirmed unless the court finds one of the grounds
for refusal of enforcement or recognition 55 contained in the Convention. Section 208 provides that Chapter 1 applies to arbitrations
brought under Chapter 2 where there is no conflict between
them. 56
49.
50.
51.
52.

9 U.S.C. § 204 (1988).
9 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
9 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
The ability to order arbitration outside the United States under § 206 of

Ch. 2 of the USAA is broader than the power under Ch. 1. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (Pemex), 767 F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th Cir.

1985).
53. Section 206 had been construed so as to permit the appointment of arbitrators to preside over arbitrations outside of the United States. McMAHON,
supra note 41, at 757.

54. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
55. It should be noted that a number of states have recently enacted statutes governing international arbitration, including California, Florida, Hawaii
and Texas. For a discussion of state international arbitration laws, see, e.g., William P. Mills, III, Note, State InternationalArbitrationStatutes And The U.S.
ArbitrationAct: Unifying The Availability of Interim Relief, 13 FoRDHAi L.
REVIEW 604 (1989). It is the author's view, shared by others, that state international arbitration laws might add to inconsistent application of arbitration rules
in the international context. See Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 43, at 215.

56. 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1988).
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B. Application

1. FourPart Test of Arbitrability
In determining whether a controversy falls within the Convention, the courts apply a four part test.5 7 The first part is whether
there is an agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject of the dispute; the second is whether the agreement provides for arbitration
in the territory of a signatory to the Convention. The third is
whether the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, which is considered commercial. The fourth is
whether a party to the agreement is not an American citizen, or
whether the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states.58
In the context of reinsurance, the first, second and fourth questions are usually answered in the affirmative. Reinsurance agreements are usually in writing, often involve foreign entities, and may
call for arbitration in the territory of a signatory to the Convention.
The third question, i.e., whether the legal relationship is commercial in nature, is somewhat more difficult to resolve.
2. CommercialRelationship Limitation
The United States, in acceding to the Convention, restricted
applicability thereof "to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the United States."5 9 Section 202, as
noted, also contains this limitation. None of the provisions in Chap60
ter 2, however, define the term "commercial relationship."
It is well settled that the business of insurance is commercial in
nature, and that a dispute between an insolvent insurer and another
company - at least prior to liquidation - is arbitrable where there
is an arbitration agreement.6 1 The question in the context of insol57. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982).
58. Id.
59. The Convention, supra note 1. This reservation is in accord with Article

1(3) which provides:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under Article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement
of awards only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also
declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of
legal relations]i-ps, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.
60. Indeed, the Convention itself was also criticized due to the varying definitions of commercial relationship which might arise in a given country. McMahon, supra note 41, at 743.
61. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533 (1944)
(this case was superseded by statute, as stated in Western & Southern Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981)); Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453
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vency is the effect of a subsequent liquidation on the commercial
relationship between the two original contracting entities. Does insolvency transform the commercial relationship of these entities
into something else when the liquidator becomes involved? 62 The
author's view, as discussed below, is that insolvency does not nullify
the relationship which originally existed between the parties.
If the four part test is satisfied, a court must refer the matter to
arbitration unless an exception to arbitration under the Convention
is applicable.
C. Exceptions to Arbitration Under the Convention
1.

Article Il Exceptions to Recognition of Agreement

Article 1163 of the Convention enumerates certain grounds on
which the court may base a refusal to recognize or enforce an arbitral agreement. Only two provisions contained in Article II are applicable to an insolvency situation. First, Article II(1) provides that
an arbitration agreement shall be recognized if it concerns "subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration."64 Second, Article
11(3) provides that an arbitration agreement is enforceable unless
the court finds the agreement itself "null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed." 65 The Convention does not specify
66
what law governs the determination of these issues.
F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971); NECA Ins. Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 595 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
62. These questions will be discussed more fully infra at text accompanying
note 133.
63. Article II of the Convention provides as follows:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration....
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this Article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The Convention, supra note 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. One commentator stated as follows: "As nothing is said in the Article
about the governing law to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement,
it may be assumed that courts will make such determination on the basis of
their own law, including the applicable conflict rules." Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration,The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 296
(1959). Indeed, as discussed infra at text accompanying notes 119-22, the determination of the applicable law in construing the validity of the agreement is a
critical inquiry.
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It can be argued that the declaration of insolvency renders the

subject matter of the liquidator's dispute incapable of settlement by
arbitration. It also can be argued that placement of the insolvent
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court renders the
arbitral agreement null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed. These arguments are based on state law insolvency provisions which basically vest the state liquidation court with
exclu67
sive jurisdiction over the affairs of an insolvent insurer.
2. Article V. Exceptions to Enforcement of Award
Article V 68 of the Convention enumerates the grounds on
which a court may refuse to confirm an arbitral award. Section 207
incorporates Article V of the Convention.6 9 Examined below are
the grounds for refusal to confirm an arbitration agreement that
are applicable to an insolvency situation.
67. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the provision of the New York
Insurance law applicable to insurance insolvency.
68. Article V provides in part as follows: Recognition and enforcement of

the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award
was made; or
(b) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contain decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or....
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
The Convention, supra note 1.
69. Section 207 provides as follows:
Award of Arbitrators; Confirmation; Jurisdiction; Proceeding. Within
three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made,
any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
under this chapter... for an order confirming the award as against any
other party to the arbitration. The Court shall confirm the award unless ii
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.
9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
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a. Article V(1)(a)
The Convention provides in Article V (1)(a) that recognition of
an award may be refused if the parties "were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity." The issue here is whether
the incapacity relates to the time of the agreement or the time of
10
the arbitration proceeding.
It has been argued that this exception refers to a party's capacity at the time of the arbitration itself.71 One commentator has
stated:
Although this exception, on its face, seems to refer to the parties' capacity at the time the arbitration agreement was made, rather than to
their capacity at the time of the arbitration proceedings, the background of the provision suggests that the drafters were concerned with
ensuring that both parties be properly represented during arbitration
proceeding, therefore, the
provision refers to the parties' capacity at
72
the time of arbitration.
Under this interpretation, a court might give weight to the apparent
intention of the drafters in ensuring that all parties are properly
represented at the time of the arbitration.
It has also been suggested that the wording of this exception
suggests a court may refuse enforcement based on the status (capacity) of the

parties, regardless

representation.

of whether

they are

afforded

73

There is, nevertheless, an argument that the incapacity relates
back to the time of the contract, and thus, the intervening liquidation does not effect the party's capacity. 7 4

b. Articles V(1)(c), 2(a) and 2(b)
The Convention also provides in Article V(1)(c) that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the

"award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration." In contrast to
Article V(1)(a), which turns on the status of the party, it appears
that Article V(2)(a) applies to the nature of the dispute itself.

70. See generally Jay. L. Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International
Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 614-16 (1983).
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id. This commentator acknowledges, however, that Article V(1)(a)
might refer back to the validity of the agreement itself since there is a reference
to Article II which pertains to the agreement and not the resultant award. Id.
at 614 n. 73. It is also noteworthy that the word "were" is used in Article
V(1)(a), which suggests a reference to a point in time before the arbitration
hearing.
73. Id. at 614; CoNrINi, supra note 66, at 300-01.
74. Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989), rev'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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Article V(2)(a) sets forth another ground for non-recognition
of the award. This exception is applicable where the claim is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the domestic law of the
enforcing state. It appears that Article V(2)(a) also applies to the
nature of the dispute itself.
Finally, Article V(2)(b) broadly excepts enforcement of awards
that are contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state. This
exception is construed narrowly and must contravene the "state's
most basic notions of morality and justice."7 5 Courts have thus rejected the public policy defense in a variety of circumstances, including where a U.S. company argued that it abandoned a
construction project in Egypt after severance of diplomatic relations
between the U.S. and Egypt in 1967,76 where an award based on
testimony which contradicted prior testimony was alleged to be
contrary to principles of justice,7 7 and where an award was alleg78
edly obtained under fraudulent circumstances.
III. CASE LAW
The leading case in New York with respect to the arbitrability
of disputes with insolvent insurance companies was Knickerbocker
Agency, Inc. v. Holz. 79 In that case, the Superintendent of Insurance, as liquidator of Preferred Accident Insurance Company,
brought an action in New York State Supreme Court against Knickerbocker to recover $5,818.35 in purported unearned commissions
under a canceled liability.80 Knickerbocker filed an answer, which
contained a defense that the matter should be arbitrated.8 ' Knickerbocker then instituted a special proceeding demanding that the
Superintendent show cause why the court should not compel arbitration of the dispute.8 2 The Superintendent argued that liquidation of Knickerbocker precluded arbitration. 83
The lower court ordered arbitration to proceed and stayed the
75. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Gen. de L'Industrie du

Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); La Societe Nationale Pour La
Rechercheine Prod., Le Transp., La Transformation et La Commercialisation
Des Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.

1983), affl'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984).
76. Parsons& Whittemore Overseas Co., 508 F.2d at 974.

77. Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation, Ltd., 737

F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984)
78. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical
Instrument, 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
79. 149 N.E.2d 885 (N.Y. 1958). Interestingly, the decision in Knickerbocker
was rendered the same year that the Convention was being negotiated.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 888:
Id,
Id.
Id,
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action.84 The appellate court reversed, holding that the liquidation
scheme, in particular Article XVI of the New York Insurance
Law,8 5 vested exclusive jurisdiction over all claims concerning an
86
insolvent insurer in the Supreme Court.
Knickerbocker argued on appeal that the Superintendent
stands in the shoes of the insolvent insurance company in the prosecution of a claim against a debtor, and thus, could not disregard an
arbitration clause in a contract entered into between the insolvent
company and the debtor prior to liquidation.8 7 Knickerbocker
made a distinction between that situation and the prosecution of a
claim by the creditor of an insurer in liquidation against the
Superintendent.8 8
In rejecting this argument, the New York Court of Appeals
held that Article XVI of the New York Insurance Law, as it pertained to the liquidation of insolvent insurance companies, furnished a comprehensive method for the winding up of affairs by the
Superintendent.8 9 The Court of Appeals held that these provisions
were "exclusive in their operation and furnish[ed] a complete procedure for the protection of the rights of all parties interested."' 9
The Court of Appeals found that the Supreme Court was intended
to have exclusive jurisdiction of claims for and against an insurer in
liquidation. 91
The Knickerbocker court stated that at the time of insolvency
and liquidation the contractual provisions relating to arbitration became of no effect.92 Further, it was noted that Knickerbocker was

on notice when it entered into the contract that the arbitration pro93
visions were subject to the New York Insurance Laws.
Recognizing that the Superintendent takes the place or steps
into the shoes of the insolvent insurer, the Knickerbocker court
held that the Legislature did not contemplate turning over liquidation proceedings to arbitration tribunals. 9 4 The court noted that
federal bankruptcy laws vest exclusive jurisdiction in district courts
and permit arbitration only when express authorization is provided
84. Id85. Article XVI of the New York Insurance Law has since been amended.
For a discussion of the provisions of Article XVI, see Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d
960, 962 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. Knickerbocker, 149 N.E.2d at 888.
87. Id88. Id89. Id- at 888-89.
90. Id- at 889, (quoting Matter of Lawyers Title & Guar. Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 484,
486 (1938)).
91. Id-at 889.
92. Id93. I&
94. Id. at 889.
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in the Bankruptcy Act. 95
The court stated that, since Article XVI of the Insurance Law
contains no statutory authority for arbitration, the Supreme Court
"may not be ousted of jurisdiction in favor of an arbitrative tribunal." 96 The court noted that it was essential that the assets of the
insolvent company be administered under the supervision of one
court so as to provide for an efficient liquidation.9 7 The court also
noted that "other courts, except when called upon by the court of
primary jurisdiction for assistance, are excluded from
98
participation."
The Knickerbocker court stated that "perhaps" the Legislature's reason for the withholding of authorization for arbitration
was as follows:
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a

radical difference in ultimate result.... Arbitrators do not have the
benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete
as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited
than judicial review of a trial.99
Finally, the court concluded that its decision was not concerned
with non-residents, as the parties in that case were New York residents.10° Indeed, the Knickerbocker court was not confronted with
the Federal Arbitration Act or the Convention. It would be ten
years before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted
with a request to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act.' 01
In Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Natl Life Ins.
Co.,' 0 2 the district court granted Hamilton's motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4 of the USAA, and Republic lodged on
appeal.' 0 3 Hamilton was under the supervision of the Insurance
95. Id. at 889-90.
96. Id. at 890. This language reminds one of the British justification for

declining arbitration.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Mottow v. Southern Holding and Sec. Corp., 95 F.2d 721,
725-26 (8th Cir. 1938)). It may well be this comment that the liquidation court
in Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989), rev'd, 562 N.Y.S.2c1 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), relied upon in retaining
jurisdiction of a dispute between an insolvent insurer and its reinsurers for purposes of any award rendered while referring the matter to arbitration. Indeed,
in referring a matter to arbitration the Court "of primary jurisdiction" (i.e.,
New York's Supreme Court can be deemed to "call upon" the arbitration tribunal "for assistance").

99. Knickerbocker, 149 N.E.2d at 890-91 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)).

100. Id at 891.
101. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat;l Life Ins. Co., 408
F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
102. 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
103. Id. at 607.
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Department. 10 4 Republic argued on appeal that it was entitled to a
trial as to the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, that the
powers granted to the arbitrators under the arbitration agreement
violated due process of law, that the court lacked in personamjurisdiction, and that the agreement was in violation of the McCarranFerguson Act. 10 5 With reference thereto, Republic argued that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act barred arbitration under the USAA. 1° 6
Hamilton reasoned that the McCarran Act laid the ground work for
10 7
state regulation of insurance, free from federal intervention.
The Second Circuit found that only when a state has not acted
would federal regulation become effective.' 0 8
The court held that the McCarran Act does not exempt the
business of insurance from all federal statutes which do not specifically apply to insurance.109 The McCarran Act only precludes application of federal statutes to insurance when they invalidate,
impair or supersede relevant state regulation.110
While the Hamilton court did not extensively discuss this issue,
it noted that the arbitration laws only regulate the method of handling contract disputes in general"' and, thus, do not implicate the
McCarran Act since they do not regulate the business of insurance.
Bernstein v. CentaurIns. Co., 112 involved a suit by Ambassador
Insurance Company and Horizon Insurance Company against Centaur Insurance for sums due under reinsurance contracts. 1 3 Am104. Id- at 608.

105. Id.
106. Id at 610.
107. Id at 611.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Similarly, the district court in Mutual Reins. Bureau v. Great Plains
Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 455 (D. Kan. 1990), concluded that a state statute, in
effect, precluding arbitration with respect to "contracts of insurance" was not
applicable to an arbitration clause in a reinsurance agreement.
In Mutual Reinsurance,a Kansas state arbitration statute provided for the
enforceability of arbitration clauses except for those in a "contract of insurance." Id. at 461. The court found that a reinsurance contract was a "contract
for insurance" not a "contract of insurance" and, thus, not within the ambit of
the statute. Id (Most reinsurance professionals would likely disagree with this
statement and view reinsurance as a contract of insurance. See KRAMER, supra
note 6, at 4 (reinsurance is "an insurance contract"). Nevertheless, the court in
Mutual Reinsuranceseems to have reached the correct result. It does not seem
likely that the Kansas legislature by its statute was attempting to preclude arbitration in the reinsurance context even in the absence of a liquidation proceeding since to do so would contradict the longstanding historical custom of
reinsurers to arbitrate. The court in Mutual Reinsurance could have reached
the same result by recognizing that the strong federal policy for arbitration
would not invalidate, impair or supersede the Kansas arbitration statute.
112. 606 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
113. I& at 100.
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bassador and Horizon were placed into liquidation and the New
i 4
York and Vermont Rehabilitators were substituted as plaintiffs."
The court reasoned that no state law explicitly precluded arbitration, and that the case law which infers that rule does so with respect to cases within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." 5
The Bernstein court held that Knickerbocker did not govern
the case at bar because the case was not brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court and was not brought
under Article XVI of the New York Insurance Law." 6 It was noted
that, unlike Knickerbocker, the defendant was a non-resident of
New York." 7 Interestingly, the court also found that the McCarran Act exempted state practices from preemption only if a states'
law is invalidated, impaired or superseded." 8 According to the
Bernstein court, the McCarran Act did not exempt "state policies
' 9
for which no specific law is enacted.""
It was not long before Bernstein was criticized by a New York
State Supreme Court in MichiganNatl Bank-Oakland v. American
Centennial Ins. Co.' 2 0 There, the court held that Bernstein's conclusion that Knickerbocker represented state policy and not state
law was incorrect. 121 The Michigan Nat? court held that the
Knickerbocker court's reading of Article XVI was "the law of the
state." 32 2 The Michigan Natl court utilized as a rationale that arbitration could result in piecemeal litigation, duplication of effort and
123
inconsistent results.
114. Id
115. Id. at 103.
116. Id.
117. I&
118. Id.
119. Id-at 103. It should be noted that Bernstein was followed in Ainsworth
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1985). There, a court in Missouri
held that arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act should proceed, however, it was noteworthy that in Ainsworth the plaintiff could not point to a
specific provision in the Missouri Insurance code which prohibited arbitration.
Thus, the court concluded that arbitration would not "invalidate impair, or supersede" any Missouri law.
120. 521 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). Prior to Michigan National, a
federal district court in New York rejected the reasoning in Bernstein.In Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) the court held that arbitration of a claim against the liquidator of an insolvent insurer would violate
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in that it would impair or supersede Article 74 of
the New York Insurance Law.
The Washburn court concluded that New York's highest court (i.e., the
Knickerbocker court) construed the Insurance Law to provide "exclusive jurisdiction over the liquidation of insurance companies in the New York Supreme
Court that takes charge of the liquidation, and to override and nullify arbitration agreements. Id.
121. Michigan Nat'l Bank-Oakland, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 620.

122. Id.
123. Id.
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In Corcoranv. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc.,124 a New York
Supreme Court directed arbitration to proceed on the ground that
the Convention was the supreme law of the land with precedence
over local statutes. 125 The court noted that the issue of the application of the Convention was not raised in Michigan Natl and that
AIG Multi-Line involved foreign corporations. 126 In analyzing the
Superintendent's argument that the arbitration clauses were ineffective, the court reviewed Article V(1)(a) and Article V 2(b) of the
Convention. 127 The court viewed the incapacity exception (Article
V(1)(a)) in light of "internationally recognized defenses[s] such as
duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver"'2s and held that the exception
was inapplicable. Additionally, the court held that the incapacity
referred to in Article V(1)(a) dealt with an incapacity at the time
the parties entered into the contract.n 9
The court also noted that the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) is construed narrowly and must contravene "the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice."'130
124. 539 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), rev'd,562 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990).
125. Id at 636.

126. Id. at 637. Seven of the reinsurers had their principal place of business
in Hamilton, Bermuda.
127. Id at 636. The Court, in addressing Article V(1)(a), referred to an incapacity which might render the agreement "null and void". Id However, it does
not appear that the Court addressed Article II (3)'s "null and void" exception to
arbitration. Indeed, the Court did not address any of Article II's exceptions to
the enforce ability of the arbitral agreement, but simply reviewed defenses that
would exist under Article V in the event an award was rendered.
128. Id. at 636 (quoting, Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d
50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983)).
129. Id
130. Id. (quoting, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
LlIndustrie du Papier (Rakta), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)). The decision in
AIG Multi-Line was appealed by the liquidator to the Appellate Division, First
Judicial Department. Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 562 N.Y.S.2d
933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). The Appellate Division reversed in light of its own
decision in Ardra, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on December 20,
1990. It is interesting to note that AIG Multi-Line was commenced by Union
Indemnity Insurance Company of New York ("Union") on February 7, 1985
prior to its liquidation. Union was placed into liquidation by order entered July
16, 1985, and the Superintendent of Insurance was substituted as a party plaintiff. The reinsurers initially moved to compel arbitration on March 2, 1985.
Because of Court confusion over the conversion of the New York State Court
System from a Special Term to an Individual Assignment System, whereby
Judges would be assigned a case through trial similar to the federal court system, it was years before a Judge was assigned to hear the case and not until
March 6, 1989 that the matter was referred to arbitration by the Supreme
Court. The Appellate Division, First Judicial Department reversed on November 29, 1990, and the parties are now engaged in the initial phases of discovery as
of the date of this publication. If the matter had been placed into arbitration
somewhere near the time that the reinsurers had made their initial motion, in
all likelihood, the dispute would have been arbitrated to a conclusion by now. It
is interesting to note that for the years 1976 to 1980, the National Center for
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IV.
A.

ARDRA

Background and Holding

In Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co.,1 3 1 Nassau Insurance Company
was a New York corporation, licensed to conduct insurance business
in New York. Nassau was owned by Jeanne S. DiLoreto and Richard A. DiLoreto. 132 In 1976, the DiLoretos formed Ardra Insurance
Company, Ltd., a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in Hamilton, Bermuda. The president of Ardra was Jeanne
133
DiLoreto.
Nassau and Ardra entered into three international reinsurance
agreements between 1978 and 1982.-' The reinsurance agreements
pertained to policies written by Nassau covering commercial automobile liability, general liability, lawyers and professional liability,
excess liability and personal injury protection benefits issued pursuant to the New York statutory no fault laws.135 Under the reinsurance agreements, Nassau ceded to Ardra a substantial portion of the
risks under each policy issued by Nassau. 3 6 Nassau paid Ardra
$10,682,924 in reinsurance premiums. 3 7 The reinsurance agreements contained broad arbitration clauses, which required arbitration of any dispute between Nassau and Ardra.13 s
Nassau experienced financial difficulties and attempts were
made to rehabilitate the company. 139 In 1981, the Superintendent
commenced a liquidation proceeding under Article 74 of the New
York Insurance Law.140 The Supreme Court of New York appointed plaintiff as the liquidator and authorized him to wind up
Nassau's affairs, including the taking of possession of property, collection of outstanding debts, payment of claims and collection of reinsurance recoverables. 14 ' The Superintendent began to settle
claims under Nassau's policies. 142 Ardra reimbursed Nassau for
certain claims under the reinsurance agreements, but ceased to
State Courts examined medium disposition times for 32 civil courts in urban
areas. The New York Supreme Court finished 27th in the study with a median
disposition time of 931 days. THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE REPORT
OF ACTION UNIT No. 6 OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 2-3 (Apr. 1,

1985).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

567 N.E.2d 969, 970 (N.Y. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991).
Id. at 970.
Id.
IdId.
Id.
Id.
IdId
Id
Id.
Id.
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make payments thereunder sometime in February 1985.143 Richard
DiLoreto wrote to the Superintendent repudiating the reinsurance
agreements on the ground that the Superintendent had refused to
allow Ardra's representatives to participate in court proceedings involving third party claims against insureds of Nassau. 144 The Superintendent then commenced action seeking reinsurance
recoverables alleged to be due from Ardra and damages from the
DiLoretos arising from their purported use of a "shell" corporation
to obstruct recovery of Nassau's obligations to its creditors and
45
insureds.1
The defendants moved for a dismissal' 46 and to compel arbitration under the Convention as well as provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. 14 7 The Supreme Court of New York denied the
motion, concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act protected the
Superintendent from the requirements of the Convention and the
Federal Arbitration Act.' 48 This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,149 which held that arbitration was not required due to various exceptions in the
Convention which removed the Superintendent from the provisions
thereof. Specifically, the Appellate Division held that the arbitral
agreement was "null and void" under Article 11(3) of the Convention.150 The court found that Article 74 of the New York Insurance
Law vested "exclusive jurisdiction" over the affairs of an insolvent
insurer in the Supreme Court, thereby rendering arbitration
51
clauses inoperative.'
The Appellate Division also held that the dispute was not of a
commercial nature under Article I(3) of the Convention. 152 The
court found that the liquidation of Nassau transformed the relationship of the parties from a commercial nature to one of a regulatory
nature.1 5 3 This was because the Liquidator sued Ardra as a fiduciary on behalf of Nassau, as well as policyholders and the general
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id146. Prior to this motion, defendants had removed the action to federal
court. The district court remanded on grounds of abstention. Corcoran v. Ar-

dra, 657 F.

Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The order of remand was affirmed on
appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 842 F.2d

31 (2d
147.
148.
149.
150.

Cir. 1988).
Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 970.
I& at 971.
Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
Id. at 697.

151. Id.

152. Id. at 698.
153. Id
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public at large.1M
The Appellate Division also held that the dispute was not arbitrable under Article V, 1(c), 155 Article V, 2(a)156 and Article V,
1(a) 157 of the Convention. 158 The defendants appealed to New
York's highest court, the Court of Appeals. 159
In a unanimous opinion the Court of Appeals stated that the
threshold question was preemption. 16 0 The court noted that under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, all treaties
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land.' '161 The court acknowledged that any state or federal law that prevented the federal government from speaking with one voice in international trade
matters should bow to superior authority. 162 According to the
court, if the Convention mandates arbitration, it preempts the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the state insurance laws which empower the Superintendent to litigate on
behalf of insolvent insurers. 16 3 The court thus focused on the appli164
cability of the Convention and not on the Federal statutes.
The court discussed implementation of the Convention in the
United States and then plaintiff's first contention that the Convention was not applicable because the dispute was not of a commercial
nature. 65 The Superintendent argued that the dispute was not
commercial, because he was a fiduciary implementing a statutory
regulatory scheme at the direction of the court. 166 The court dis154. Id.
155. Id. The court found that there did not exist "a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration." Id.
156. Id. The court found that the subject of the dispute was not capable of
settlement by arbitration.
157. Id. The court found that the parties were "under some incapacity."
158. Interestingly, the Court "assumed" that the strict standard applicable to
the public policy defense (Article V (2) (b)) had not been met. Id. at 697.
159. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990), cert denied, 111
S. Ct. 2260 (1991).
160. 1d. at 971.
161. Id,
162. Id. It is clear that any purported conflict between the Convention and
the McCarran Act should meet with an attempt for resolution of the two provisions. However, it can be legitimately argued that the Convention would not
"invalidate, impair or supersede" the states' regulation of the business of insurance. This is because arbitration will not truly oust the liquidation court of jurisdiction. In referring a dispute to arbitration, a court does not a fortiori
relinquish its jurisdiction over a case. It retains jurisdiction pending referral to
an arbitration panel subsequent to which the court can pass on the validity of
the award. See text accompanying footnote 151 for a discussion of whether referral of a dispute to arbitration would "invalidate, impair or supercede" New
York insurance law.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 971-72.
166. Id. at 972.
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agreed with the Superintendent's argument in this regard. The
court concluded that the nature of the relationship between the two
entities should be determined at the inception of the agreement and
not at the time enforcement of rights and obligations thereunder
are sought. 167 The court noted that the original agreements between Nassau and Ardra were commercial and thus found that the
dispute arose out of a commercial relationship within the meaning
of Article 1(3).168
Recognizing that the drafters did not intend to require arbitration in all international commercial disputes, the court went on to
discuss certain exceptions to the Convention. 69 The court noted
that Article II requires recognition of an arbitral agreement only
when it pertains to a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration, and that the court may refuse to compel arbitration if the
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performedY7 0 The court noted that these exceptions must be imple17 1
mented by examining the domestic law of the acceding nation.
The court stated that insurance is generally a matter of state concern, and therefore, the laws of the individual states should govern. 172 The court thus applied Article 74 of the New York
173
Insurance Law in interpreting exceptions under the Convention.
The court determined that the original contracting parties and
their relationships had changed, since Nassau no longer existed.1 7 4
The court recognized that the Superintendent "stepped into the
shoes" of Nassau in the sense that he succeeded to its property. 175
However, the court determined that the Superintendent was a fiduciary, subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
167. Id
168. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 972. On this point, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the Appellate Division which apparently was of the view that the relation-

ship had been transformed to one of a regulatory nature. 553 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
169. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 972.
170. Id.
171. Id
172. Id- There is authority for the proposition that a federal statute will not

preempt the exercise by a state of authority in an area "traditionally occupied
by a state law" unless that is clearly the purpose of Congress. Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
However, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985), the Court stated:
Concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.

173. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 972.
174. Id
175. Id.
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possessing only those powers authorized by the Legislature. 78 The
court cited Article 74 of New York Insurance Law.177 The liquidator's duty is to protect policy-holders, stockholders and the public.178 It was noted that the legislature had not granted the
Superintendent the power to participate in an arbitration proceeding.179 The court noted that, in fact, despite the ruling in Knickerbocker and enactment of amendments to the Insurance Law, the
Legislature had not authorized the Superintendent to arbitrate. s0
Thus, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was not capable of being performed (Article 11(3)), and that the claims were not
capable of settlement by arbitration (Article II(1)).18s
The court noted that its interpretation was also supported by
Article V of the Convention. 8 2 Under Article V, arbitral awards
may be denied if "the subject matter of the difference is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country."' 8 3 It
was noted that the practical results of the Article II and Article V
exceptions were to relieve parties from proceeding through a futile
arbitration where the award would be unenforceable.L84 The court
noted that its decision construing the exceptions was appropriate so
as to give effect to New York's strong public policy in the maintenance of Supreme
Court jurisdiction over liquidation
proceedings.la 5
The court recognized strong contrary policy concerns of international comity, which militate in favor of arbitration. 8 6 However,
the court found that the underlying concerns of the Convention
were not implicated there. 8 7 The DiLoretos were principals of
both Ardra and Nassau, and they owned both companies.' 8 8 Nassau
and the Diloretos were New York residents, amenable to process in
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id
179. Id.

180. Id181. Id. at 973.
182. Id.
183. Id
184. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 973. Interestingly, it has been noted that the Convention delegates did not intend the exceptions under Articles II and V to be in
conformity. Thus, the Article 11(3) language with respect to agreements was
not linked to the enforcement provisions of Article V. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 531 n.10 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Nonetheless, it is clearly
preferable to avoid enforcement of an agreement under Article II if the subse-

quent award would not be enforceable under Article V. See WESTBROOK, supra
note 70, at 631 n.142.
185. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 972.
186. Id187. Id.
188. Id
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New York both personally and by designating a New York agent to
receive process.18 9 The reinsurance contracts also referred to New
York law in their clauses. 19° According to the court, Ardra had reason to anticipate when the contracts were executed that arbitration
was not permitted under Article 74 of the New York Insurance
Law.191 The court stated that this case did not "present an international merchant subjected to unfamiliar judicial proceedings and
the vagaries of foreign law."'192 Thus, the court concluded that
while the reinsurance agreements fell within the broad terms of the
Convention, the Superintendent was excepted from the terms
193
thereof.
V.

ANALYSIS

In determining that the threshold question was one of preemption, it appears that the Ardra court properly focused on the Convention, and not on Chapter I of the USAA or on the McCarranFerguson Act. The court determined that the Convention took precedence over the McCarran Act,19 4 although there was previous decisional law that application of the McCarran Act precluded
95
arbitration under Chapter 1 of the USAA.'
The court properly recognized that the nature of the relationship between the Superintendent and Ardra should be determined
at the inception of the agreement. It is recognized that a liquidator
steps into the shoes of an insolvent company for purposes of any
dispute. His rights emanate solely from that company, and he is
subject to the same defenses that could be asserted against the insolvent.196 Moreover, Article I(3)'s commercial limitation provision
189. Id.
190. id.
191. id192. Id.
193. Id.
194. It does appear that the Convention would prevail over the McCarranFerguson Act, since it is a later expression of the sovereign will. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTruTIoNAL LAw 167-70 (1978); Louis Henkin, The
Treaty Makers and the Law Makers; The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 906 (1959). Where there is a conflict "between an
Act of Congress and a treaty, - both being the supreme law of the land - the
later in date must prevail in the courts." Ribas Y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S.
315, 324 (1904); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974), reh'g denied
(1975); United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 752 F.2d
1505 (10th Cir. 1985). The Convention was enacted in 1970. The McCarranFerguson Act was enacted in 1945.
195. Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Matter of
Union Indem., 521 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
196. See supra text accompanying note 133 for a discussion of the liquidator's
rights as derived from the insolvent company.
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applies to the nature of the dispute or "differences," and not to the
status of a party.
Nonetheless, the court in Ardra determined that, since exceptions to the Convention must be construed under domestic law, and
since insurance is generally a matter of state concern, the laws of
individual states governed construction of the exceptions. Thus, the
court held New York law to be controlling in determining applicability of the Convention's exceptions. 197 In so holding, the court ensured that international arbitral policy concerns would fall to the
New York rule which precludes arbitration in a liquidation
situation.
Determination of the law applicable to evaluate arbitrability
under Article II is no easy task. The Convention does not specify
what substantive law is applicable in construing whether a matter
should be referred to arbitration under Article H1.198 In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,199 the Supreme
Court stated as follows:
The Convention... requires the recognition of agreements to arbitrate that involve "subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration," [and] contemplates exceptions to arbitrability grounded in
domestic law. (citations omitted) And it appears that before acceding
to the Convention the Senate was advised by a State Department
mem2°
orandum that the Convention provided for such exceptions. 0
In the context of our federal system, the Ardra Court determined that state law would be applicable in construing Article 1.201
197. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 973. In making this determination, the court necessarily viewed the liquidation of insurance companies as constituting the business of insurance, thereby falling within the ambit of state regulation under the
McCarran Act. This characterization of the liquidation of an insolvent insurance company appears to be reasonable under the criteria established by the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458
U.S. 119, 134 (1982); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
198. Interestingly, Article V is more specific as to what body of law is applicable to determine enforcement of the award. For example, Article V(2)(a)
bars enforcement of an arbitral award when the "subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country."
Article V(2)(b) is applicable when "enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Article V(1)(a) bars enforcement of
an arbitral award if the parties were "under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it." As noted in footnote 111, supra, however, the Convention delegates excluded references to the applicable law from Article II. It
has been stated that determination of the validity of the arbitral agreement by a
court should be made on the basis of its own country's law, which includes conflict of law rules. CONTINI, supra note 66, at 296.
199. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
200. Id at 639 n.21. However, in that same footnote, the Court stated that
the usefulness of "the Convention in promoting the process of international
commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of national courts to let go
of matters they would normally think of as their own." Id.
201. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 972.
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To be sure, Article XI of the Convention contemplates that countries with federal systems might possibly limit operation of the Convention.20 2 It is nevertheless arguable that the Court was wrong on
this point, in that it applied New York State law or, at the very
least, did not give due consideration to the federal policy favoring
arbitration.
It has been stated that determination of arbitrability under Article II should not only be made in light of the policy which favors
the enforcement of arbitral agreements, but should also promote
"standards which can be uniformly applied on an international
scale. ' 20 3 In I. T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. PodarBros.,204 the Fifth Circuit
was confronted with the issue of whether a party had waived its
right to arbitrate by virtue of its alleged delay and limited participation in a legal action. Against the policy favoring arbitration and in
an attempt to foster the adoption of standards to be applied on an
international scale, the court directed arbitration to proceed under
the Convention. 20 5 Similarly, in Rhone MediterraneeCampagniav.
Lauro,2 6 the Third Circuit held that the law referred to in Article
II(3) is the law of the United States, not the local law of a particular
state.20 7 The court in Rhone based its conclusion on 9 U.S.C. § 203,
which provides that a proceeding falling within the Convention
shall be construed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United
States and that such an action is removable to federal court under 9
U.S.C. § 205.208 The court in Rhone found Article 11(3) applicable so
as to preclude arbitration only when the agreement is subject to an
"internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud,
or waiver... or... when it contravenes fundamental policies of the
2 9
forum state."
Similarly, the First Circuit in Ledee v. CeramicheRagno,210 refused to interpret provisions of the law of the Commonwealth of
2 11
Puerto Rico so as to render an arbitral agreement null and void.
The court found that the parochial interests of the nation could not
202. Significantly, however, Article XI(b) contemplates that the federal government shall encourage the Constituent States to take action to require arbitration. See supra note 152.

203. I.T.A.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981) (right
to arbitration under Convention not waived).

204. 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981).
205. Id
206. 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983) ("null and void" within Article H1(3) construed in light of "an internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud or waiver").
207. Id. at 54.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 53.
684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
Id. at 187.
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be the measure by which to interpret an arbitration clause under
Article 11(3), much less could the parochial interests of a Commonwealth or State be taken into account in that regard. 212 The court
found that the "null and void" language in Article 11(3) encompasses instances that could be applied neutrally on an international
scale.

2 13

More recently, the court in Meadows Indem. Co. v. Baccala &
Shoop Ins. Servs., Inc.,214 directed arbitration to proceed under a
number of reinsurance contracts, concluding that they all encompassed claims of fraud. The court held that the question of arbitrability under Article II(1) should not be based on the domestic
laws of only one country, but on standards which can be applied on
an international scale.215 With reference to Article 1(3), the court
216
applied the Rhone standard.
It is submitted that a neutral standard that could be applied on
an international scale could arguably result in denial of arbitration
in a liquidation situation just as easily as it could result in an order
compelling it. Opponents to arbitration might contend that a rule
denying arbitration in this situation could easily be developed and
recognized in the international community at large. What seems to
be important, however, as noted by the court in LT.A.D., is to consider the strong policy reasons in favor of arbitration, while at the
same time attempting to foster an international standard. 17
The policy behind American adoption of the Convention was to
encourage the recognition of arbitral agreements and to unify the
standards governing their recognition and enforcement. It can be
posited that the international standard, which is embodied in the
Convention, is to encourage arbitration. The use of a standard that
would recognize arbitration in a liquidation situation unless the liquidator's rights were prejudiced might take into account those considerations underlying the Convention. It can be asked why a state
liquidation rule should trump this well-recognized international
policy in the absence of a compelling reason.
212. I&
213. Id. The court described those possible situations to include fraud, duress, mistake and waiver.
214. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4144, at 30 (E.D.N.Y. March 29, 1991).
215. Id. This standard raises interesting questions as to how the determination can be made that a law could be applied neutrally on an "international
scale." Thus, with reference to insolvency, should a court review the applicable
precedent in a number of jurisdictions, or alternatively, should it attempt to
formulate its own standard that it perceives to be easily and justly applied in
other countries? For a discussion of a national arbitration, defined as one not
governed by any particular nation's law, see, e.g., Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration,63 TuL. L. REv. 629 (1989).

216. Id.
217. See I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981).
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The court's holding that the arbitral agreements were incapa-

ble of being performed and thus that claims were not capable of
settlement by arbitration under Article II, on the ground that the

New York legislature had not empowered the liquidator to arbitrate, 218 ignores the fact that the liquidator's rights are consistent
with those of the insolvent. Although the court recognized that the
liquidator steps into the shoes of the insolvent company, it was pos-

tulated that the liquidator was a fiduciary, subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, without power to arbitrate.2 19
However, the fiduciary position in which the liquidator finds himself should not override the original intent of the parties to the original contract, particularly where arbitration will not prevent the
liquidator from carrying out his fiduciary duty to protect the interests of policyholders, stockholders and the public. Indeed, the liquidator, as noted, has no different position than the insolvent and
takes the latter's rights subject to the same defenses as existed prior
220
to insolvency.
If insolvency does not change the relationship of the parties

from one of a commercial nature, the insolvency similarly should
not work to undermine the arbitrability of the dispute under Article II(1). Ldeed, Article II(1), refers to the subject matter of the
dispute. Likewise, Article 11(3) refers to the subject matter or type
of the agreement, not the status of a party at the time of arbitration.
The liquidators involvement, if it does not change the nature of the
relationship under Article 1(3) (i.e., commercial nature), should not
change the nature of the dispute for purposes of Article II(1).221
218. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969, 972 (N.Y. 1990), cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991).
219. Id
220. This rule has been recognized by the common law for some time. See,
e.g., Arizona Corp. Comm. v. California Ins. Co., 236 P. 460 (Ariz. 1925); Ray v.
First Nat'l Bank, 63 S.W. 762, 770 (Ky. 1901); Bohlenger v. Zangor, 117 N.E.2d
338, 341 (N.Y. 1954); All Star Ins. Corp. v. APS Ins. Agency, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 828
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983); Kelly v. Commonwealth Mut. Ins. Co., 299 A.2d 604, 606
(Pa. 1973).
As stated in Korlann v. E-Z Pay Plan,Inc.:
It is a well-established principle that a liquidator or receiver occupies no
better position than his insolvent occupied at the time of insolvency. He
takes the property and rights of the one for whom he acts, subject to the
same equities and defenses in others that existed before insolvency.
428 P.2d 172, 176 (Or. 1967) (citations omitted).
221. This is not to say that Article 1(3) and Article II(1) are identical in application. As should now be apparent, Article 1(3) refers to differences arising out
of relationships which are commercial and broadly addresses the scope of the
Convention. Article II(1) refers to differences which concern a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration and pertains to enforceability of the arbitration agreement for purposes of referral of a matter into arbitration. Neverti-eless, if a relationship is sufficiently commercial for the purpose of falling
u: -ler the scope of the Convention despite the liquidator's involvement (Article
()), the subject matter of the dispute should not be considered incapable of
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The argument that resolution of a dispute with an insolvent is
subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not dissimiliar to the judicial vigilance which protected diminishment of
jurisdiction through arbitration prior to the adoption of the USAA.
Specifically, the Ardra court stated:
Arbitrators are private individuals, selected by the contracting parties
to resolve matters important only to them. They have no public responsibility and they should not be in a position to decide matters affecting insureds and third-party claimants after the contracting party
has failed to do so. Resolution of such disputes is a matter solely for
the Superintendent,
subject to judicial oversight, acting in the public
22 2
interest.

This hostility seems outdated in light of the extensive inroads
that arbitration has made in other areas. For example, it now appears difficult to accept that arbitration should yield to New York's
Liquidation law where claims under state securities law,223 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2

4

the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 225 the Securities Act of 1933,226
and antitrust claims 227 are arbitrable. Indeed, there is no express
statutory authorization to arbitrate any of these claims.
Moreover, arbitrators generally do view themselves as having
the responsibility to render a fair and just decision. The Code of
Ethics of the American Arbitration Association requires that arbitrators must seek to uphold both the integrity and fairness of the
arbitral process, 22 8 should conduct proceedings fairly and dili-

gently229 and should render a just, independent and deliberate decision.230 I submit that these standards are generally followed by all
arbitrators.
Arbitrators also are capable of adjudicating complex matters,
particularly in the technical field of reinsurance. Indeed, an arbitration panel with significant business experience may be in a better position to understand the intricacies of a reinsurance
settlement by arbitration (Article 11(1)) by virtue of the involvement of that
same liquidator.
222. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 973.

223. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985).
224. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
225. Id.
226. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
485 (1989).
227. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
640 (1985).
228. CODE OF ETHIcs FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMCIAL DIsPUTEs Canon I
(1977). The Code of Ethics was prepared by a Joint Committee which consisted
of a Special Committee of the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association, respectively.
229. Id. at Canon IV.
230. Id. at Cannon V.
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transaction than a court of general jurisdiction presiding over a liquidation. If the resolution of United States antitrust claims could
be entrusted to Japanese businessmen, it might not be inappropriate to have a reinsurance professional preside over a reinsurance
dispute.
The Ardra court ensured application of the state rule due
through its conclusion that "[t]he underlying concerns of the Convention [were] not implicated here."'23 1 This was based on the finding that Ardra was not "an international merchant subjected to
unfamiliar judicial proceedings and the vagaries of foreign law requiring a 'sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes.' "232 The
court arrived at this conclusion because the DiLorettos were principals of both Nassau and Ardra, amenable to process in New York
233
and the contracts referred to New York law as applicable.
The founding fathers clearly desired treaties to be binding on
states. 234 Recognizing that a treaty was the focal point of inquiry,
the court in Ardra should have given greater weight to the policies
underlying the treaty power ,n general and the Convention in particular. There is clearly an argument for supremacy of international law, and/or the policies that favor arbitration, over the New
York Liquidation laws. This "supremacy" derives in part from
membership in the world community. Professor Thomas Franck
had this to say:
It is easily demonstrable that the international community believes,
and acts on the belief, that a rule-hierarchy exists and obligates states.
The most recent instance of this is to be found in an advisory opinion
rendered by the International Court of Justice on April 26, 1988. In it,
the judges unanimously aver the existence of an obligation deriving its
pull to compliance not from specific consent but from membership in a
community. That opinion was given at the request of the United Nations General Assembly after the U.S. Congress had enacted a law,
later signed under protest by President Reagan, requiring the closing
of the Observer Mission of the Palestinian Liberation Army. That law
violated the U.S. Government's own interpretation of its obligations
under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement. In such a conflict between a
treaty obligation and a national law, the Court said, the treaty obligation is paramount. It confirmed the fundamental principle of international law that it prevails over domestic law and, in support, cited its
own earlier opinion that in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot pre231. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969, 973 (N.Y. 1990). cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2260 (1981).
232. Id. (quoting, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Ply.nouth, 473
U.S. 614, 629 (1985)).
233. Ardra, 567 N.E.2d at 973. The court apparently concluded that Ardra
should not reap the benefit of the policies underlying the Convention.
234. For a discussion of treaties as law, see, e.g., Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTION, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

62-63 (1990).
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vail over those of a treaty. The point was confirmed in a concurring
opinion of the U.S. Judge, Stephen M. Schwebel, who wrote that a
State cannot avoid its international responsibility by the enactment of
domestic legislation which conflicts with its international obligations.
In other words, the sovereign will of states is subordinate to obligations
that derive from their status as members of a community. 3 5
Additionally, this is not a situation where the treaty power
would unreasonably encroach on states' rights. 236 The power given
to states pursuant to the McCarran Act was via Congressional legislation to allow states to regulate the insurance industry. It is not
unreasonable to conclude that the policies favoring arbitration underlying the Convention should outweigh the states' power to regulate insurance. This is particularly so where referral of the dispute
to arbitration will not work truly to the detriment of the liquidator.
The liquidator will not be abdicating his fiduciary duties by proceeding in an arbitration forum. His prosecution of the insolvent's
claims can proceed in arbitration, subject to "judicial oversight," in
that the liquidation court retains the ability to confirm or reject the
award.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' decision is not a positive development in
the law of either arbitration or reinsurance. First, in relegating international policy concerns to New York's interest in state court
liquidation proceedings, the decision will cause confusion and uncertainty among foreign reinsurance corporations. Uncertainty will
not foster the development of business in the international reinsurance market.m
Second, this confusion could have a detrimental effect on New
York's effort to promote itself as a center for international arbitration. If New York state law does not enforce the right to arbitrate,
reinsurance corporations might question the desirability of utilizing
New York as an arbitration forum. The certainty of arbitration, as
opposed to uncertainty dependent upon whether a corporation is
sufficiently an "international" merchant, would only encourage the
continued use of New York as a viable arbitration location.
Third, Ardra could hinder effective resolution of international
reinsurance disputes by requiring bifurcated proceedings. For ex235. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 188-189
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
236. See, e.g., Robert B. Looper, Limitations On the Federal Treaty Power,34
N.Y.U. L REv. 1045, 1049 (1959).
237. Indeed, recent court rulings have imposed security on foreign reinsurers in litigation in New York. It is questionable whether an arbitration panel
would require the posting of such security. In this respect, the litigation of a
reinsurance case in New York could have very real adverse consequences to a
reinsurer, which would not otherwise exist in an arbitration situation.
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ample, in a situation where a cedent seeks recoverables from various reinsurance participants in an arbitration, the insolvency of one
reinsurer would cause the cedent or liquidator to pursue recovery
in both arbitration and in court. This result is even less desirable in
a situation where insolvency occurs during the course of an arbitration after the expenditure of substantial effort by the parties. The
decision in Ardra would require the parties to go back to square one
in liquidation court. Indeed, there is even a possibility of inconsistent results where a cedent pursues a claim against solvent reinsurers in arbitration and against the insolvent reinsurer in liquidation.
Finally, the decision could add significant legal costs and delay
to the Superintendent's task where reinsurers continue to seek arbitration on the ground that Ardra is distinguishable from their situation. For example, a foreign reinsurer, might seek to compel
arbitration, arguing that it is genuinely a foreign corporation, unlike the Ardra corporation, which the superintendant argued was
only a "shell" owned by New York residents.
These adverse results could be avoided through either a limited
reading of Ardra by future courts or a more practical analysis of the
situation, while at the same time protecting the liquidator's desire
to obtain a fair, just and speedy resolution of the Estate. Arbitration should not be viewed as ousting the New York Supreme Court
of its exclusive jurisdiction. It only provides an alternative forum in
which the parties submit their factual dispute to the panel for adjudication. The award itself does not become binding as a judgment
until reviewed by the Supreme Court on an application to confirm,
and the court has the power to reject the award under Article V in
appropriate circumstances. In this manner, the referral of a dispute
to arbitration should not be viewed as dissimilar to the referral of a
case to a referee or federal magistrate to hear and report, although
the standards for review are not all in accord. The liquidation court
thus remains involved in the dispute resolution process and essentially retains jurisdiction of the action while "referring" the dispute
to the arbitration panel for a determination on the merits.238 Indeed, even after referral of a case to arbitration the parties may
resort to Court before rendition of the arbitral award for assistance
in appointment or removal of arbitrators and/or discovery under
appropriate circumstances. In that regard, the Court can exercise
control over the proceedings itself prior to passing on the enforce238. This distinction was at least tacitly recognized by the court in Corcoran
v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 630, 637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989),
rev'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). There the matter was referred to
arbitration, while the court explicitly stated that it would "retain jurisdiction
with respect to any award rendered." Id. See supra text accompanying notes
93-97 for a discussion of the AGI Multi-Line case.
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ability of the award. Judges should be mindful of the ways in which
arbitration can be utilized to ease the burden on their courts.
In view of Ardra, it may well be that a state legislative pronouncement explicitly authorizing courts to refer matters to arbitration while retaining jurisdiction under Article 74 should be
considered, so as to avoid confusion and uncertainty in future international reinsurance arbitration situations. The U.S. Congress
could facilitate arbitration itself either through the adoption of its
own legislation providing for referral of a dispute with a liquidator
to arbitration, or through encouragement of state legislatures to
take action to require arbitration under these circumstances. 239
The arbitrability of a dispute with a liquidator should not be
viewed as adversely affecting the liquidator, policyholders, stockholders or the public at large. Arbitration can provide a speedy,
just, and fair resolution of the dispute, while alleviating the burdensome workload of the liquidation court. This is particularly true in
the technical field of reinsurance. The referral of a dispute to arbitration will effectuate the intent of the original contracting parties
and alleviate uncertainty in the dispute resolution process, thereby
encouraging the continued utilization of New York as a center for
international reinsurance arbitration.

239. With reference to federal States, the Convention provides under Article

XI as follows:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the
legislative jurisdiction of the federal authority, the obligations of the
federal government shall to this extent be the same as those of Contracting States; (b) with respect to those articles of this Convention that
come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which are not, under the constitutional system of the federation,
bound to take legislation action, the federal government shall bring
such articles with a favorable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the earliest
possible moment.
The Convention, suprm note 1, at Article XI.

